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In recent years, the Supreme Court's approach to civil 
rights law has engendered trepidation in the civil rights commu- 
nity. The most glaring example of the Court's approach to civil 
rights law was its sua sponte re-argument order in Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union.' The only issue that was presented by 
- 
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1. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In its re-argument order, the Court directed the parties to 
respond to the following question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1981 
adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsid- 
ered." Id at 171. In Runyon, the Court decided that 42 U.S.C. $ 1981, which provides, in 
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the Court's re-argument order was whether 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 
was enacted pursuant to Congress's Thirteenth2 or Fourteenth 
Amendment3  power^.^ Ultimately, the Court afbned its ruling 
pertinent part, that blacks had "the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is 
enjoyed by white citizens," was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment and, therefore, could be used as the basis for a claim against solely private 
actors. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). 
2. Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provide: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropri- 
ate legislation. 
U.S. CONS. amend. XIII, $5 1, 2. 
3. Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provide: 
~edtion 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
. . . . 
Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
U.S. CONS. amend. XIV, $0 1,s. 
4. The question of the source of Congress's power to enact civil rights laws is critical 
because under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to reach private actors. 
The Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), said that Congress had 
the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to "rationally . . . determine what are the 
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into 
effective legislation." Id at 440. Relying on the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the 
Court held that Co-ngress had the power to enact laws to prohibit private individuals from 
engaging in acts of racial discrimination. Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39. 
In contrast, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to situa- 
tions wherein the action that results in the deprivation of constitutional rights can be traced 
to a state actor. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, stated 
that: 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . is prohibitory in its char- 
acter, and prohibitory upon the States. 
.... 
. . . CT]he last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to 
enforce it by appropriate legislation. . . . [Congress may] adopt appropriate legis- 
lation correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus 
to render them effectually null, void and innocuous. . . . [Sluch legislation must 
. . . be predicated upon. . . State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the 
correction of their operation and effect. 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-12. Thus, if the Court had decided in Patterson that 
Runyon had been incorrectly decided and that the statute in question was enacted pursuant 
solely to Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, then the scope of $ 1981 
would be limited to remedying deprivations of the right to contract on the basis of race 
wherein state laws or officials connected with the state had denied blacks the right to 
contract. 
Heinonline - -  66 Tul. L. Rev. 1358 1991-1992 
19921 CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 1359 
in Runyon v. McCrary,' despite the view of certain members that 
Runyon had been decided in~orrectly,~ and held that 5 1981 was 
enacted pursuant to Congress's Thirteenth Amendment powers.' 
Notwithstanding the reaffirmance of Runyon, civil rights 
scholars and lawyers are still concerned about the Court's 
approach to civil rights. Their anxiety over the Court's 
approach may increase during the October 1991 Term of the 
Court. During that term, the Court will again have the opportu- 
nity to unsettle an entire body of civil rights law when it re- 
examines another post-Civil War civil rights statute-42 U.S.C. 
5 1985(3)*-the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic presents the Court with the opportunity 
to revisit that statute in a slightly unusual context. In Bray, sev- 
eral abortion clinics and abortion rights organizations applied 
for permanent injunctions to enjoin an anti-abortion organiza- 
tion and its members from "trespassing on, blockading, imped- 
ing, or obstructing ingress to or egress from" facilities providing 
abortion services.1° The district court held that the blockading 
of abortion facilities by the defendants infringed upon the consti- 
tutional right to travel of women seeking to obtain abortions at 
5. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
6. Justices Breman, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented from this part of the 
opinion. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189 (1989). 
7. Id at 171-75. 
8. Section 1985(3) provides: 
If two or more persons in any State or Temtory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of 
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Temtory from 
giving or securing to all  persons within such State or Temtory the equal protec- 
tion of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimida- 
tion, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his 
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any 
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a 
Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or 
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set 
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be 
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is 
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right 
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may 
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva- 
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
42 U.S.C. 8 1985(3) (1988). 
9. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 E2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). 
10. Id. at 584. 
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clinics in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).11 The.Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis- 
trict court's issuance of a permanent injunction on the ground 
. that the activities of the defendants "had crossed the line from 
persuasion into coercion and operated to deny the exercise of 
rights protected by law."12 The court also affirmed the district 
court's holdings that "gender-based animus satisfie[d] the 'pur- 
pose' element of 1985(3)" and that blocking abortion facilities 
which serve an interstate clientele violates the constitutional 
right to travel.13 
The Court in Bray will have the opportunity to decide sev- 
eral key issues regarding the coverage of 1985(3). One issue is 
whether women or women seeking an abortion constitute a class 
under the statute. Another issue is whether private actors can 
violate the federal constitutional right to interstate travel when 
they hinder access to abortion clinics. Those are the nominal 
issues that the Court can be expected to address; however, there 
are broader issues that an activist Court may reach out to 
answer, as the current Court attempted to do in Patterson. 
Those issues could involve a question similar to the one raised in 
the Patterson re-argument order: whether or not the interpreta- 
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) adopted by the Court in Grznn v. 
Breckenridge l4 should be reconsidered. 
In Grznn, the Court effectively reversed its prior determi- 
nation of the elements needed for a claim under § 1985(3) and 
the source of Congress's power to enact the statute. Previously, 
in ColIins v. Hardyman,l5 the Court held that fj 1985(3) was 
enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers 
and thus could only reach deprivations of constitutional rights 
by state actors.16 In GrzBn, the Court stated that private actors 
could be held liable under § 1985(3) and that Congress had the 
power to sanction private discrimination under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.17 Given the apparent conflict between the two 
11. Id 
12. Id at 585. 
13. Id. 
14. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
15. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 
16. Id at 657-59. 
17. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105. The Court held that "Congress was wholly within its 
powers under . . . the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for 
Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private 
action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men." Id. 
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cases regarding the scope of 8 1985(3) and the constitutional 
power that Congress exercised when it enacted the statute, the 
Court in Bray may be presented with another opportunity to 
thwart the Reconstruction Congress's efforts to provide a federal 
remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights by private cit- 
izens or organizations. 
A review of the legislative history of 8 1985(3) reveals that 
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute was to provide a fed- 
eral remedy for the deprivation of the newly acquired constitu- 
tional rights of the freed slaves and other classes of persons 
whose rights were being denied by terrorist organizations 
because of their political views. The debates are replete with ref- 
erences to the violence and brutality directed at these classes of 
citizens and the complete failure of state or local officials to take 
any steps to remedy this situation. In addition, the members of 
the forty-second Congress were concerned about the rights and 
safety of southern-born white citizens who had supported the 
federal government and of northerners who had moved to the 
South after the Civil War in an effort to rebuild that war-torn 
region. The legislative record is full of examples of violence and 
intimidation directed at those two classes of white citizens. In 
short, the evil that Congress sought to address was wanton vio- 
lence directed at black and white citizens at the hands of private, 
marauding, masked organizations. With respect to which rights 
Congress sought to protect under the statute, the legislative his- 
tory reveals that when Congress used the term "privileges and 
immunities" in 8 1985(3), it intended that all rights which the 
Constitution afforded to United States citizens were to be 
included within the penumbra of 5 1985(3). As to the source of 
Congress's power to enact this law, the debates show that the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were looked 
to as authorization for the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act 
of 1871. 
Finally, an analysis of the legislative history demonstrates 
that both Collins and Gr13n unduly restricted the scope of 
5 1985(3). Collins restricted the statute to incidents solely 
involving state actors.'* Grzpn limited the statute to cases in 
which a racially discriminatory, class-based animus was pres- 
ent,19 thereby making it uncertain whether classes other than 
18. Collins, 341 U.S. at 659. 
19. Grzsn, 403 U.S. at 102. 
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racial groups could sue under the statute. The Court in Bray 
will have the chance to address these issues and to resolve the 
questions left unanswered in Grz3n. 
In Part I1 of this Article, the legislative history of the Act is 
scrutinized to determine the factual predicate that led to the 
enactment of 5 1985(3) and the classes Congress sought to pro- 
tect under its provisions. The legislative history is also analyzed 
to determine which rights Congress sought to protect in 
§ 1985(3). Part I11 discusses the Supreme Court's misinterpreta- 
tion of the statute and attempts to provide guidance as to the 
proper outcome in Bray. 
11. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 
Ku KLUX KLAN 
A. The Evil To Be Remedied 
The impetus for the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was a 
request by President Grant for additional legislation to deal with 
the growing crisis in the southern states.20 Several issues emerge 
from the message Grant sent to Congress. First, a breakdown of 
law and order existed in the southern states, which endangered 
life and limb. Second, the state governments were powerless to 
remedy this emergency. Third, Grant did not believe that he 
legally had the authority to intervene. The state of affairs that 
Grant wanted addressed resulted from the resistance mounted 
by former Confederate soldiers and slave masters to the emanci- 
pation of the slaves, the political alliance between the freed per- 
sons and the Republican Party, and the 'destruction of the 
southern "way of life."21 On March 28, 1871, in response to 
Grant's request for additional legislation, Representative Samuel 
20. On March 23, 1871, President Grant sent the following message to Congress: 
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the States of the Union rendering l ie  
and property insecure . . . . The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in 
some localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is 
beyond the control of the State authorities I do not doubt that the power of the 
Executive of the United States, acting withim the limits of existing laws, is sufE- 
cient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore I urgently recommend such 
legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure lie, liberty, and 
property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States. 
President Grant's Message to Congress, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (Mar. 23, 
1871). 
21. See generally W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION I
AMERICA (1935); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
(Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1961); KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865- 
1877 (1965). 
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Shellabarger introduced House Bill 320, which was entitled "An 
Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, and for Other P~rposes."~~ 
22. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. 
$8 1983, 1985 (1988)). Section one of the bid provided a remedy for persons whose consti- 
tutional rights had been violated by individuals acting under the color of law. That section 
was later codified at 42 U.S.C. $1983. Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1289 (1979). As 
originally introduced, section two provided criminal penalties in cases of conspiracies to 
violate constitutional rights by committing the crimes of murder, robbery, assault and bat- 
tery and other crimes. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22,17 Stat. 13,13 (1871). On April 5,1871, 
Shellabarger introduced an amended version of section two that provided: 
That if two or more persons within any State or Temtory of the United States 
shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the 
Government of the United States, or to levy war against the United States, or to 
oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States, or by force, 
intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the 
United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United 
States against the will and contrary to the authority of the United States, or by 
force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any person from accepting or holding any 
office of trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging 
the duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer of the 
United States to leave any State, district, or place where his duties as such officer 
might lawfully be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on 
account of his l a d l  discharge of the duties of his office, or by force, intirnida- 
tion, or threat to deter any witness in any court of the United States from testify- 
ing in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to injure 
any such witness in his person or property on account of his having so testified, or 
by force, intimidation, or threat to in!luence the verdict of any juror in any court 
of the United States, or to injure such person in his person or property on account 
of any verdict lawfully assented to by him, or shall conspire together for the pur- 
pose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons 
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the 
laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of 
any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal pro- 
tection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or property for lawfully 
enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the 
laws, each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, 
and, upon conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States, 
or district or supreme court of any Temtory of the United States having jurisdic- 
tion of similar offenses, shall be punished by a h e  not less than $500 nor more 
than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may 
determine, for a period of not less than six months nor more than six years, as the 
court may determine, or by both such h e  and imprisonment as the court shall 
determine; and if any one or more persons engaged in such conspiracy, such as is 
defined in the preceding section, shall do or cause to be done any act in further- 
ance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his 
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of 
a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or deprived of such rights and 
privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages occa- 
sioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or 
more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted in 
the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the 
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in l i e  
Heinonline - -  66 Tul. L. Rev. 1363 1991-1992 
1364 TULANE LAWREVIEW pol. 66 
Throughout the debate on the bill, the speakers discussed 
the evidence and nature of the problem that the Klan and simi- 
lar organizations presented. The incidents graphically demon- 
strated the evil that the Klan represented, its purposes, and the 
methods used to effectuate its ends. The evidence revealed that 
the Klan used violence and terror against blacks, supporters of 
blacks, and Republicans in an effort to undo the gains of the 
Reconstruction era. The Klan also directed its anger at 
northerners (carpetbaggers) who had come south after the war 
and at native southerners (scalawags) who supported the Recon- 
struction policies of the federal government. In addition, by 
using the same tactics against government officials, the Klan 
sought to supplant state and local governments. In some 
instances, those officials either acquiesced or conspired with the 
Klan. Finally, the Klan vented its fury on indicia of federal 
authority. 
With respect to the purpose of the Klan, Representative 
William Stoughton canvassed the available evidence23 about the 
Klan in North Carolina. He stated that the Klan had a political 
purpose and was composed of members of the Democratic and 
Conservative Parties.24 It used murders, whippings, intimida- 
tion, and violence in pursuit of its political objectives. Stoughton 
contended that no Klansmen in North Carolina had been con- 
victed of a crime.25 He explained this by observing that a 
cases in such courts under the provisions of the act of April 9, 1866, entitled "An 
act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish 
the means for their vindication." 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1871) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE]. Section three 
gave the President the right to dispatch federal troops to deal with violence when a state 
was unable to protect its citizens from lawlessness. Id at 317. Section four empowered the 
President to declare martial law when a state government was supplanted by an armed 
assemblage or when the state conspired with such groups to deprive citizens of constitu- 
tional rights. Id 
23. There were no evidentiary hearings held prior to the introduction of the Ku Klux 
Klan Act. Congress relied on a report issued by a Select Committee of the Senate to Inves- 
tigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States. See S. REP. NO. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1871). While the Committee was established to examine the existence of the Klan in the 
southern states, it was only able to investigate conditions in North Carolina. The report 
concluded that the Klan was responsible for numerous murders, whippings, and shootings 
in that State. Regarding the purpose of the Klan, the report found that the Klan was 
opposed to the policies of Reconstruction, including the enfranchisement of blacks. See 
EVERETTE SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE KU KLUX KLAN: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
RECONSTRU~~ION AME DMENTS 1870-1877 (1987); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TER- 
ROR, THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971). 
24. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 320. 
25. Id. 
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Klansman was required to commit perjury if called as a witness 
in the trial of a fellow traveler and to vote to acquit, notwith- 
standing the evidence, if selected as a juror in cases involving 
Klan~men.~~ 
In support of his assertions, Stoughton relied on the testi- 
mony of James E. Boyd before the Senate Select Committee. 
Boyd was a lawyer, former Confederate soldier, and a Klansman 
from Alamance County, North Car~lina.~' He testified that the 
Klan's purpose was to defeat the Reconstruction policy of Con- 
gress and to prevent blacks from voting.28 He further testified 
that the Klan was supportive of the policies of the Democratic 
Party.29 Regarding the membership of the Klan, Boyd stated 
that the majority consisted of former Confederate soldiers and 
that it was a well-organized, paramilitary-type organi~ation.~~ 
Boyd averred that the Klan used any means necessary to carry 
out its objectives, including murder.31 He stated that there were 
forty thousand members of the Klan in North C a r ~ l i n a . ~ ~  
Representative Garfield, who shared Stoughton's views of 
the purpose of the Klan, stated: 
To state the case in the most moderate terms, it appears that in 
some of the southern States there exists a wide spread secret 
organization, whose members are bound together by solemn 
oaths to prevent certain classes of citizens of the United States 
from enjoying these new rights conferred upon them by the 
Constitution and laws; that they are putting into execution 
their design of preventing such citizens from enjoying the free 
right of the ballot box and other privileges and immunities of 
citizens, and from enjoying the equal protection of the laws.33 
Other speakers in the House supported the thesis that the Klan 
was a covert, terrorist organization designed to eliminate the 
gains of Reconstr~ction.~~ 
26. Id 
27. Id. 
28. Id 
29. Id 
30. Id 
31. Id. 
32. I d ;  see also SWINNEY, supra note 23, at 132-33. 
33. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 153. 
34. Representative George F. Hoar suggested that the Klan was attempting to restore 
the state of affairs that existed before the Civil War. 
In many States of this Union, ever since they came into existence as part of the 
Union, all rights, civil, political, and personal, have been denied to one part of 
their population. So far was there from being any tendency to correct this evil. . . 
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In the Senate, similar views about the aim of the Klan were 
expressed. Senator John Pool stated that the North Carolina 
Klan had between forty and sixty thousand members and that its 
members were ordered by the organization to commit crimes in 
furtherance of its ~bjectives.~~ Senator Oliver P. Morton 
believed that the purpose of the Klan was to use terror and vio- 
lence to intimidate blacks and others from supporting the 
Republican Party and its political ~bjectives.~~ 
The proponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 relied on 
evidence which revealed that the Klan was a paramilitary organ- 
ization that used violence to achieve its political objectives. The 
victims of that violence were blacksY3' supporters of 
that the civil right of discussing. . . the rightfulness. . . of this state of things and 
the political right of voting to put an end to it was also denied, with penalty of 
banishment or death to any person of the dominant race whose sense of public 
duty might so incline him. It is true this penalty was not expressed in terms on 
the statute-books; but it was executed by the mob . . . . [Wlhen it was found that 
the association under the General Government with other States where attach- 
ment to civil liberty prevailed endangered this state of things, the people of these 
States sought to destroy the nation itself rather than run the risk that . . . the 
indirect influence of this association might overthrow the tyranny they had estab- 
lished. The principal danger that menaces us to-day is from the effort within the 
States to deprive considerable numbers of persons of the civil and equal rights 
which the General Government is endeavoring to secure to them. 
Id at 335. Representative John Coburn, in discussing the Klan's purpose, painted a pic- 
ture of total lawlessness in the South. 
mhere is a preconcerted and effective plan by which thousands of men are 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting power is fettered, the 
witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal 
goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. This condition of affairs 
extends to counties and States; it is, in many places, the rule, and not the 
exception. 
Id at 459; accord id at 443-49 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id at 320-21 (remarks of Rep. 
Stoughton); id at 339 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id at 437 (remarks of Rep. Cobb). 
35. Id app., at 107. Senator Pool quoted the Klan's oath to illustrate its purposes: 
"That you will oppose all Radicals and negroes in all their political designs." Id 
36. Senator Morton stated: 
We are not at liberty to doubt that the purpose is by these innumerable and narne- 
less crimes to drive those who are supporting the Republican party to abandon 
their political faith or to flee from the State. A single murder of a leading Repub- 
lican will temfy a whole neighborhood or county. The whipping of a dozen 
negroes, because they are negroes and asserting their right to the equal enjoyment 
of liberty, property, and the expression of their opinions, will have the effect to 
temfy those who live for miles around. 
Id. app., at 252. Thus, in Morton's view, the evil was not merely that the Klan engaged in 
racially motivated or politically motivated violence against individuals, rather, Morton was 
concerned that the impact of the terror spread far beyond the victims of the Klan. Com- 
pare id at 157 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) with id at 197 (remarks of Sen. Ames). 
37. There were numerous examples of Klan violence directed at blacks. When speak- 
ing before Senate Select Committee, Representative Stoughton quoted the testimony of 
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symbols of the federal and  republican^.^^ Addi- 
Thomas W. Willeford, a former member of the North Carolina Klan, who stated that the 
purpose of the Klan was to damage the Republican Party by burning, stealing, whipping 
blacks, and murdering. Id at 320. Stoughton also quoted the testimony of Caswell Holt 
who stated that he had been whipped and shot by the Klan because he had voted for the 
Republican party. Holt testified that blacks in his vicinity did not feel safe and that many 
had decided to leave. Id at 321. Stoughton recounted an incident which occurred in Mis- 
sissippi wherein Klansmen attacked and shot at blacks who were attending a trial. Id at 
322. As further evidence of the Klan's propensity for violence against blacks, Stoughton 
relied on the testimony of James E. Boyd, who stated: 
The most serious instance in my county. . . was the hanging of a negro man by 
the name of Outlaw, who was taken from his house . . . about one o'clock at 
night, by a band of from eighty to a hundred men, and hung upon an elm tree, not 
very far from the courthouse door. 
Id at 320. When Boyd was asked what offense Outlaw had committed, Boyd replied, "I 
never heard of any." Id Boyd also testified that another black man, William Puryear, was 
murdered because it was feared that he had witnessed the lynching of Outlaw. Id ; see also 
id at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar). 
Representative Butler recounted an incident wherein the Klan fired on a house occu- 
pied by blacks and severely injured a black resident. Id at 445. Another incident involved 
the Klan forcing a black minister to flee his home in Missiiippi and subsequently burning 
his home and church to the ground. Id Senator Morton suggested that one of the reasons 
for the attacks on blacks was their former status. He stated that "colored people, because 
of prejudices against their race, because they were formerly slaves and ha[d] been released 
against the will of their masters" were subjected to Klan violence. Id app., at 251. 
38. Representative Butler described the following incident: 
1 . . . call the attention of the House to a publication of the American Mis- 
sionary of October, 1870, of the taking from the hands of the officer of the law 
and murder of Rev. W.C. Luke, a clergyman of the Methodist Episcopal church, 
and a missionary . . . whose only offense was that he was teaching the blacks the 
rudiments of an education under a commission from his bishop. Himself and four 
of his pupils were taken from the hands of the sheriff, who had arrested them, 
although they had done no wrong, and at midnight, by a band of thirty armed 
ruffians, hanged to trees, his murderers even refusing to transmit a last letter writ- 
ten to his wife and little ones as he was preparing to yield up his spirit to Him 
who gave it. 
Id at 446. 
39. Representative Butler stated that federal agents were whipped and shot at for 
attempting to carry out their duties. Id at 445. Butler also read into the record the follow- 
ing letter regarding an incident that took place in St. Augustine, Florida, wherein purchas- 
ers of property from the federal government were ejected: 
Hordes of ruthless, armed men. . . entered by force and took possession of prop- 
erty purchased by loyal citizens from the agents of the United States Gov- 
ernment, and occupied by feeble, invalid ladies; and by these armed men these 
ladies, with their furniture and their protectors, were forcibly thrust out of doors. 
And the intruders now hold possession in fearless defiance of any law that now 
exists. . . . 
Id at 447. When the intruders were brought before a justice of the peace, he dismissed the 
criminal complaint on the grounds that there was no law against entering a house. Id 
40. According to Representative Butler, 2,000 Republicans were killed, wounded by 
gunshot, or seriously injured by Klansmen or members of other similar organizations. Id 
at 444. He quoted the following language from the report of the Senate committee which 
investigated the Klan: 
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tionally, the Klan sought to obstruct local government with its 
tactics.41 At times, local officials acquiesced or conspired with 
In this part, including that part of Orleans comprised in this district, and St. 
Bernard, St. Helena, and Washington, the Republican party had a majority in 
1868 of over one thousand, receiving 8,565 votes. Over three hundred leading 
and active Republicans, white and colored, were killed, wounded or otherwise 
cruelly maltreated by Ku Klux, and other instruments of violence and intimida- 
tion, within sixty days preceding the election. 
Terror and dread took possession of the unprotected people, thousands of 
colored Republicans and some whites voted the Democratic ticket from compul- 
sion and fear, and the great mass remained away from the polls, and the eighty- 
five hundred and sixty-five Republican votes were reduced to eighty-four . . . . 
Id Butler also read into the record the affidavit of Henderson Cash, a South Carolina 
Republican, who had been threatened by the Klan: 
Spartanburg, South Caroliia: 
Personally appeared Henderson Cash before me, Enoch Cannon, notary pub- 
lic, and made oath that he was always loyal to the United States Government; 
that he is now forced to denounce the Federal Republican party to save his life, 
and that the Ku Klux had given him notice if he did not denounce Republicanism 
that they would kill him; and that they had been to and broke into his house on 
the night of the 25th of February; but that he (Cash) was in the forest . . . for the 
safety of his life. Said Cash further says that there is a general reign of terror in 
the community . . . and that loyal men are afraid to sleep at home in consequence 
of the many brutal outrages inflicted upon loyal men for the support of the 
Republican party. 
Id. at 447. Based on the evidence available, Butler concluded that one of the purposes of 
the Klan was to eliminate the Republican Party as a political force in the southern states. 
The race of the Republican voter was insignificant, the aim of the Klan was to prevent 
black and white voters from supporting the party of Reconstruction, and the same means 
were employed to effectuate that end: terror and violence. See, ag., id. at 391 (remarks of 
Rep. Elliot) ("The white Republican of the South is also hunted down and murdered or 
scourged for his opinion's sake, and during the past two years more than six hundred loyal 
men of both races have perished in my State alone."); id at 460 (remarks of Rep. Coburn) 
("Republicans are whipped, overawed, burned out, banished, or murdered because they 
have political opinions . . . ."); id at 702 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id app., at 252 
(remarks of Sen. Morton). 
41. Representative Jeremiah M. Wilson contended that the Klan's purpose was to 
overthrow state governments. 
w h a t  is the purpose of all this bloody work? I assert-and all well-authenti- 
cated evidence proves the truth of the assertion-that it is for the express purpose 
of controlliig government in the States where these things are done, by prevent- 
ing citizens from exercising their legitimate constitutional privileges. I t  is to over- 
throw by force and violence political opinion; it is to destroy by violence the 
freedom of the ballot-box, and therefore it is the most dangerous form of domestic 
violence and rebellion against the laws. 
Id at 484. Perhaps the most glaring example of the Klan's efforts to render the state and 
local governments null and void was the following notice from Union County, South Caro- 
lina, read into the record by Representative Butler: 
(Special Orders No. 3, K.K.K.) 
"Ignorance is the curse of God." 
For this reason we are determined that members of the Legislature, the 
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the 
In addition to the racial and Republican targets of the 
Klan, the Klan also victimized groups of individuals that held 
political views in conflict with Klan values. Representative 
Maynard stated his belief that the violence of the Klan, in addi- 
tion to being directed at blacks, was also visited upon "the native 
Unionist, the native loyal man . . . held up to odium as the 
enemy of his region, as the enemy of his people, who has sold 
himself to the enemies of his country."43 Maynard was particu- 
larly concerned about the safety of those who held views that 
were unpopular in the region.44 In his opinion, 5 1985(3) was 
school commissioner, and the county commissioners of Union, shall no longer 
officiate. 
Fifteen days' notice from this date is therefore given, and if they, one and all, 
do not at once and forever resign their present inhuman, disgraceful, and outra- 
geous rule, then retributive justice will as surely be used as night follows day. 
Id at 448. After this notice was posted, the Klan notilied the Governor of South Carolina 
that all state officials were to resign. The Governor appealed to the President to aid him in 
putting down this rebellion against the state government. Id Butler contended that the 
Klan orchestrated the impeachment of the governor of North Carolina because he used 
military forces to stop Klan violence. Id at 443. Other incidents in the record involved the 
murder of a state senator in the jury room of a courthouse on the day when a Democratic 
Party convention was in session; the arrest of the mayor of Meridian, Mississippi, by the 
Klan, who then ordered him to leave town; and the murder of a judge and eight to ten 
blacks after a riot in a courtroom. Id at 443, 445. 
In addition to attacks on the executive and judicial branches of government, the Klan 
also sought to intimidate law enforcement officers. In one case, a local sheriff was mur- 
dered because he had arrested a Klan member. Id at 444. In other cases, local law 
enforcement authorities were implicated in Klan violence. Representative Butler recounted 
an incident in Tennessee wherein a group of Klansmen fired into the home of two black 
men who returned their fire. After the Klan had been repelled, the occupants of the house 
discovered that the local constable and deputy sheriff were among the dead Klansmen. Id 
at 445. The view of the Klan as an organization that sought to overthrow state and local 
authority is supported by historians of this period. See generally DAVID M. CHALMERS, 
HOODED AMERICANISM (1965); FRANKLIN, supra note 21. 
42. Representative Aaron F. Perry eloquently addressed this problem. 
Where these gangs of assassins show themselves the rest of the people look on, if 
not with sympathy, at least with forbearance. . . . Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see 
not; judges, having ears to hear, hear noe witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; 
grand and petit juries act as ifthey might be accomplices. In the presence of these 
gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of 
justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. 
Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice. 
Of the uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is 
credibly stated that not one has been punished. 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 78. See, ag., id at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon); 
id. at 107 (remarks of Sen. Pool). 
43. Id app., at 309. 
44. In this regard, he stated: 
m h e  unpopular man, the man who entertains odious sentiments, the man whose 
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designed to protect all classes of persons who were subjected to 
attack for their political views or racial 
Representative Maynard's views regarding the classes to be 
protected under 5 1985(3) were shared by members of the Sen- 
ate. Senator Morton argued that the statute was designed to 
protect the rights of any class of citizens. He stated: 
If there be organizations in any of the States having for their 
purpose to deny to any class or condition of men equal protec- 
tion, to deny to them the equal enjoyment of rights that are 
secured by the Constitution of the United States, it is the right 
and duty of Congress to make such organizations and combina- 
tions an offense against the United States.& 
Senator Edmunds also believed that the 5 1985(3) was not lim- 
ited to cases involving racially discriminatory animus. He 
stated: 
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be 
called a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud 
of one man or set of men against another to prevent one getting 
an indictment in the State courts against men for burning down 
his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that his 
conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a 
Democrat, . . . or because he was a Catholic, . . . or because he 
was a Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it.47 
Thus in both the Senate and the House concerns were 
expressed about the deprivation of rights by the Klan based on a 
variety of identifiers, such as race, political views, religion, or 
religion . . . is at variance with the common belief, the man whose political views 
do not accord with the generally received opinions of the community in which he 
resides, finds his personal security very often in peril from the ebullitions of pas- 
sion and the gusts of anger which agitate his immediate neighbors, and which are 
not regulated or iduenced by the wider and broader opinions that obtain else- 
where in the land and among the whole people. 
Id. app., at 31 1. 
45. He stated: 
Under this section I hold that if a body of men conspire to drive out all the 
northern men, all the "Yankees," all the "carpet-baggers" from the community, 
their offense comes within the condemnation of this provision. If they combine to 
prevent the colored men from voting, the case is the same. If they combine to 
prevent men from voting the Republican ticket, the provision meets that case. 
Id. app., at 310; see also id at 320-21 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 339 (remarks of 
Rep. Kelley); id app., at 262 (remarks of Rep. Dunnell); id app., at 277 (remarks of Rep. 
Porter); id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); id at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. app., 
at 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt); id app., at 300 (remarks of Rep. Stevenson). 
46. Id app., at 251. 
47. Id at 567; see also id at 568 (remarks of Sen. Edrnunds); id. at 606 (remarks of 
Sen. Pool); id at 686 (remarks of Sen. Schurz) . 
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regional origins. In the minds of those who supported the stat- 
ute, it was designed to remedy the denial of the rights guaran- 
teed under the Constitution to all classes of citizens targeted by 
the Klan or other organizations. No supporter indicated any 
intention to limit the application of the statute to conspiracies 
motivated by racial animus. 
The incidents discussed by the supporters of the statute 
confirm that the Klan was an organization prone to violence and 
was comprised of private individuals and local law enforcement 
officers, many of whom were former Confederate soldiers and 
members of either the Democratic or Conservative Parties. 
They engaged in violence and acts of intimidation against groups 
or individuals in an effort to reverse the gains of the Reconstruc- 
tion era. Essentially, the Klan viewed with hostility blacks and 
others who either aided blacks or had come to the South after 
the Civil War. In addition to the use of brutal tactics against 
individuals, the Klan also sought to render local governments 
ineffective, including judicial officers, law enforcement agents, 
and other elected officials. Its goal was to replace the organs of 
elected government with Klan rule. Many of these local govern- 
ments were at that time controlled by blacks and Republicans. 
Faced with this breakdown of law and order, and the 
refusal, reluctance, or inability of state and local governments to 
provide redress for Klan victims, Grant sent the aforementioned 
message to Congre~s.~~ In response, Congress adopted the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 187 1. The Act's provisions provided remedies 
for the various types of problems caused by the Con- 
gress sought to provide a federal venue and cause of action to 
address the complete breakdown of law and order in the South. 
The question of which constitutional rights Congress sought to 
protect when it enacted 8 1985(3) remains unanswered. 
B. The Rights To Be Protected 
During the debates on 8 1985(3), Congress was confronted 
with facts showing a complete breakdown of law and order in 
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
49. Section one ($ 1983) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 provided a federal remedy 
where persons, acting under color of law, deprived others of their constitutional rights. See 
supra note 22. Section two ($ 1985(3)) was designed to punish, criminally and civilly, con- 
spiracies to deprive others of their constitutional rights. The thud section gave the Presi- 
dent the power to intervene militarily to suppress violence when state officials requested 
such help: Section four provided that martial law could be declared by the President when 
state authorities conspired with Klan or similar organizations. 
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the former Confederate states. Secret, paramilitary, terrorist 
organizations threatened and intimidated local law enforcement 
and other government officials from performing their duties. 
Blacks, their supporters, Republicans, and others sympathetic to 
the Union were intimidated, brutalized, and murdered because 
of their political persuasion or opinions, or, in the case of ex- 
slaves, because of their former status. In the face of this 
onslaught, the state and local governments stood powerless to 
provide shelter from the ever-increasing storm. In short, the 
Klan had replaced the traditional arbiters of government with a 
reign of terror. Many members of Congress believed that the 
states were either unable or unwilling to provide protection 
against the Klan. Thus, they sought to establish a federal forum 
for the preservation of constitutional rights in 1985(3). 
By its terms, 1985(3) provided a federal remedy when two 
or more persons entered into a conspiracy to deprive others of 
equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws. The language employed by Congress raises two 
questions. One, what rights did Congress seek to protect when it 
enacted the statute? Two, was the statute aimed at deprivations 
of those rights by private or state actors? A review of the posi- 
tions of the legislators reveals that Congress sought to protect 
rights which flowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif- 
teenth Amendments. With respect to the equal protection 
clause of § 1985(3), many of the speakers shared the view that, 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were under an 
affirmative duty to ensure that equal protection of the laws was 
afforded to persons within their borders, and that the failure to 
protect the targeted groups of persons from the Klan was a 
denial of equal protection. With respect to the privileges and 
immunities clause of § 1985(3), many of the speakers asserted 
that the statute was designed to provide a federal remedy for the 
deprivation of any privilege or immunity that the citizen had 
under the Constitution. Thus, that clause as used in 1985(3) 
was not limited to deprivations of purely Fourteenth Amend- 
ment rights. 
Commenting on the constitutional amendments that 
allowed Congress to enact § 1985(3), Representative Perry made 
it clear that he believed the conditions in the South demon- 
strated that rights secured by the three post-Civil War amend- 
Heinonline - -  66 Tul. L. Rev. 1372 1991-1992 
19921 CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 1373 
ments were in jeopardy.5o Similarly, Representative Garfield, 
speaking in support of the bill, asserted that the adoption of 
those three amendments brought about a fundamental shift in 
power between the states and the national govern~nent.~~ He
contended that, before the war, the protection of life and prop- 
erty of private citizens was purely within the province of the 
state. The enactment of these three amendments, however, 
enlarged Congress's power to legislate to ensure that rights 
secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend- 
ments were not denied or abridged.52 Garfield believed that 
Congress had the power to provide for the punishment of both 
private and state actors who deprived others of the rights 
secured by these  amendment^.^^ 
Although some members believed that Congress had the 
power to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 under all three 
post-Civil War amendments, the majority of the debates focused 
on whether Congress had the power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to punish private persons when the state failed to 
protect its residents from Klan violence.54 One theory advanced 
50. Representative Perry stated: 
The privileges and immunities secured to a large class of citizens by the thir- 
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth articles of amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States are abridged. They are deprived of life, liberty and property with- 
out due process of law. Their right to vote is abridged or denied on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and the equal protection of the law 
is denied them. 
ONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 78. Representative Maynard asserted that under 
5 1985(3) Congress was protecting, inter alia, Fifteenth Amendment rights. Id. app., at 
310. 
51. Id app., at 149-50. 
52. Id; see also id. app., at 83 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) ("The powers of the States 
have been l i i t e d  and the powers of Congress extended by the . . . [t]hirteen[th], four- 
teen[th], and fifteenith] [amendments]."); id. at 693-96 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Fur- 
ther support for this view can be found in the title of the Act, to wit: "An Act to Enforce 
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
For Other Purposes." Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
53. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 153 ("[Congress had the] power . . . to 
provide by law for the punishment of all persons, official or private, who shall invade these 
rights, and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall deprive any citizen of their fullest 
enjoyment."). 
54. The debates concerning the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment 
are significant in that many of the members of Congress in 1871 were also members in 1866 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The following Senators voted in favor of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and were supporters of the Ku Klux Klan Act: Anthony, 
Conkling, Edmunds, Ferry, Morrill of Vermont, Pomeroy, Cragin, Nye, Ramsey, Sher- 
man, Stewart, and Wilson. Id at 709. The following members of the House were involved 
in the enactment of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ku Klux Klan Act: Bing- 
ham, Kelley, Cook, Dawes, Garfield, Mercur, Myers, Scofield, and Shellabarger. Id. at 
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by the supporters of the Act was that the states were under an 
affirmative duty to provide for the equal protection of the laws to 
all persons within their borders. These legislators believed that 
the southern states, by failing to punish or convict Klan mem- 
bers of any crimes, either actively encouraged the violence or 
tacitly acquiesced in it. This failure to prosecute was viewed as a 
denial of equal protection of the laws since it was only the vic- 
tims of Klan violence who were not protected by law-enforce- 
ment authorities. In the view of the proponents of the 
affirmative duty to provide equal protection, when the state, 
through malfeasance or nonfeasance, failed to afford classes of 
persons such protection, then the Congress was empowered to 
act in its stead to prevent the deprivation of rights secured by the 
Equal Protection Clause.ss The legislators who adhered to this 
view seemed to assume that there was a conspiracy, or perhaps a 
tacit agreement, between the state or local officials and the Klan. 
The former had abdicated their responsibility to enforce the law, 
while the latter carried out the purpose of the gentlemen's 
understanding-the effective denial of all rights recently 
522. Representative Bingham has been credited as the drafter of the original equal protec- 
tion language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id app., at 86. 
55. Representative Coburn supported this view of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The failure to afford protection equally to all is a denial of it. 
Afiirmative action or legislation is not the only method of a denid of protec- 
tion by a State . . . . A State may by positive enactment cut off from some the 
right to vote, to testify or to ask for redress of wrongs in court. . . . This positive 
denial of protection is no more flagrant or odious or dangerous than to allow 
certain persons to be outraged as to their property, safety, liberty, or life; than to 
overlook offenders in such cases; than to utterly disregard the sufferer and his 
persecutor, and treat the one as a nonentity and the other as a good citizen. . . . A 
systematic failure to make arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish offend- 
ers against the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of equal protection . . . 
. and justifies . . . the active interference of the only power that can give it. . . . 
It may be safely said, then, that there is a denial of the equal protection of the 
law by many of these States. It is therefore the plain duty of Congress to enforce 
by appropriate legislation the rights secured by this clause of the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution. 
Id at 459. See, e.g., id. at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) (where state does not protect a 
particular class of its citizens from violence, state denies equal protection); id. at 428 
(remarks of Rep. Beatty) (The state denied equal protection by failing to "bring the guilty 
to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent."); id app., at 
79 (remarks of Rep. Perry) (Equal Protection Clause commands that "no State shall fail to 
afford or withhold the equal protection of the laws."); id app., at 182 (remarks of Rep. 
Mercur) ("mhe word 'deny' . . . means to refuse, or to persistently neglect or omit to give 
that 'equal protection' imposed upon the State by the Constitution."); id at 506 (remarks 
of Sen. Pratt); id. app., at 251-52 (remarks of Sen. Morton); id at 608 (remarks of Sen. 
Pool); id. at 409 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen). 
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acquired by the freed black, the rights of those who supported 
them, and the rights of other groups who espoused political 
views inimical to the Klan.56 
While there were numerous legislators who supported the 
view that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposed an affirmative duty on the states to protect 
equally all persons in their life, liberty, and property, there was a 
sharp divergence of views regarding whether Congress had the 
power under that Amendment. to punish private actors. Two 
views emerged. The radical view was that where the state 
refused to do anything to protect persons within its borders, the 
federal government had the power to replace the state, in one 
sense providing the protection that the state neglected to fur- 
nish, and punish private act01-s.'~ Under this theory, even where 
state law provided for the punishment of crimes committed by 
Klansmen, if the state failed to prosecute and thereby tacitly per- 
56. Representative George E Hoar illustrated this conspiracy theory by alluding to 
the conditions in South Carolina, which was three-fifths black. 
[S]uppose that in that State, with its constitution providing trial by jury, provid- 
ing an independent judiciary, providing for equality of civil rights, providing the 
right to vote and to hold office of every citizen, there should be a conspiracy upon 
the part of a certain portion of the people that by intimidation, by murder, by 
outrage, this majority of the people dare not exercise those rights which their 
State constitution undertakes to declare for them. Suppose that by that conspir- 
acy, secret but understood . . . every person who dared to lift his voice in opposi- 
tion to the sentiment of this conspiracy found his life and property insecure. 
Suppose that conspiracy takes possession of the jury-box, and under its rule no 
one of the majority of that State can gain his case on whatever evidence . . . . 
Suppose . . . that the constitution of the State all the time declaring that there 
shall be punishment of crime, to a particular class of citizens there is no criminal 
remedy enforced for any crime committed upon them. 
Id at 333. The state of affairs Hoar hypothesized was in fact the reality of life for blacks 
and others groups with unpopular political views in the South. The evidence before Con- 
gress established that a group of private citizens, acting in concert, through terror and 
violence prevented blacks and Republicans from casting votes for the party of their choice, 
that their lives were unprotectedby law enforcement authorities, and that no Klansman 
had been convicted of any crimes in any of the states. 
57. Representative David P. Lowe supported this view of Congress's authority. 
The argument leads to the deduction that while the first section of the [four- 
teenth] amendment prohibits all deprivations of rights by means of State laws, yet 
all rights may be subverted and denied, without color of law, and the Federal 
Government have no power to interfere. All you have to do . . . to drive every 
obnoxious man from a State, or slay hi with impunity, is to have the law all 
right on the statute-book, but quietly permit rapine and violence to take their 
way, without the hinderance of local authorities. . . . The rights and privileges of 
citizens are not only not to be denied by a State but they are not to be deprived of 
them. 
Id. at 375. 
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mitted such violence to take place, Congress could step in and 
punish the private individuals without any allegation that they 
induced a state official not to perform his duty under the Federal 
Constitution to afford equal protecti~n.'~ 
The conservative view was that if the state's officials refused 
to afford equal protection, Congress could punish the official for 
such a refusal, but Congress could only sanction private actors 
or conspirators when they prevented the state officer from per- 
forming his federal constitutional obligation of providing equal 
protection. In order for the private persons' conduct to be 
actionable, they must have induced the state officer, by violence 
or threats, to neglect his duty to provide protection. Under this 
theory, Congress had the power under the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment to punish private persons only when they interfered with a 
state officer's duty to protect equally the life, liberty, and prop- 
erty of those residing within the state.5g In the revised draft of 
section two of the Act, both views of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment were included.60 
58. See, eg., id at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon) ("Shall it be said that the citizen 
may be wrongfully deprived of his life, liberty, and property . . . and the national arm 
cannot be extended to him because there is a State government whose duty is to afford him 
redress, but refuses or neglects to discharge that duty?"); id at 334-35 (remarks of Rep. 
Hoar); id at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id app., at 68-71 (remarks of Rep. 
Shellabarger) (Act was designed to remedy denial of equal protection by providing federal 
intervention against individuals); id app., at 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton). 
59. Representative Horatio C. Burchard contended that the federal govemment 
could punish "the [state] officer who violates his official constitutional duty" to provide 
equal protection, and Congress had the power to "punish the illegal attempts of private 
individuals [who sought] to prevent the performance of official duties in the manner 
required by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id app., at 314. Representa- 
tive Luke P. Poland shared this view of Congress's power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
I cannot agree . . . that if the State authorities fail to punish crime committed in 
the State therefore the United States may step in and by a law of Congress pro- 
vide for punishing that offense . . . . 
When the State has provided the law, and has provided the officer to carry 
out the law, then we have the right to say that anybody who undertakes to inter- 
fere and prevent the execution of that State law is amenable to this provision of 
the Constitution, and to the law that we may make under it declaring it to be an 
offense against the United States. 
Id. at 514; accord id. at 486 (remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 579 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). 
60. The revised draft of section two provided: 
That if two or more persons . . . shall conspire together for the purpose . . . of 
depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws. . . or 
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State 
from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of 
the laws . . . each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high 
crime. 
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While there was some disagreement in Congress regarding 
its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate against 
private individuals for deprivations of the Equal Protection 
Clause, it appears to have been the consensus that when Con- 
gress used the terms "privileges and immunities" in § 1985(3), it 
intended to protect all privileges and immunities that a citizen 
had under any provision of the Constitution. Among the privi- 
leges and immunities that Congress sought to protect was the 
right to vote as secured by the Fifteenth Amendment and free- 
dom of speech.61 Other speakers expressed the view that the 
privileges and immunities protected under 5 1985(3) were those 
that all citizens of free governments enjoyed.62 Senator Morton 
Id at 477. The first clause of the revised draft seeks to punish a conspiracy to deny equal 
protection without reference to any interference with state officers. The second clause 
addresses that issue. Thus, it would appear that both theories of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment were incorporated into the revised bi. For a thorough discussion of the different 
views of the speakers regarding Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
punish individuals, see generally Alfred Avins, The Ku KIux Klan Act of 1871: Some 
Rejected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331 
(1967); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). 
61. In discussing what was meant by the term "privileges and immunities" as used in 
5 1985(3), Representative Maynard stated: 
I suppose it embraces all privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution; 
for example, those guarantied by the constitutional provision . . . securing to citi- 
zens of each State "all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 
It would include also the right of voting secured by the fifteenth amendment; it 
would include any of the personal rights which the Constitution guarantees to the 
citizen. 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 310. 
62. Representative Hoar addressed himself to the meaning of the term "privileges and 
immunities" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Act: " m h a t  is compre- 
hended in this term, 'privileges and immunities?' Most clearly it comprehends all the privi- 
leges and immunities declared to belong to the citizen by the Constitution itself. . . . m t  
comprehends those privileges and immunities which [are] . . . fundamental and essential to 
citizenship." Id at 334. In support of his thesis, Hoar relied on the opinion of Judge 
Washington in Corfield v. Corye11,6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), wherein 
the court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
found in Article IV of the Constitution. 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the 
citizens of all  free governments. 
Id at 551. The court went on to hold that included among the privileges and immunities 
of Article IV were, inter alia, the enjoyment of life and liberty, the right to acquire prop- 
erty, and the right of interstate travel. Id at 551-52. According to Hoar, § 1985(3) was 
intended to protect all of these rights against deprivation by a conspiracy of persons. 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 334; accord id. at 69 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, rely- 
ing on Corfield) ("Congress [has the] power to legislate directly for enforcement of such 
rights as are fundamental elements of citizenship."); id. at 475 (remarks of Rep. Dawes) 
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expressed the view that among the privileges and immunities 
protected was the right to interstate The opposition 
argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, only those rights 
that were acquired by virtue of United States citizenship could 
be protected under that Amendment and, by seeking in 
5 1985(3) to protect all fundamental privileges and immunities 
that were secured by any clause of the Constitution, Congress 
was exceeding its Fourteenth Amendment powers.64 Thus, both 
the sponsors and opponents agreed that the phrase "privileges 
and immunities" as used in 5 1985(3) was intended to reach and 
protect rights found not only in the Fourteenth Amendment but 
elsewhere in the Constitution. 
When it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Congress 
was faced with a guerilla rebellion in the former Confederate 
states. Whereas during the war the soldiers of the South wore 
grey uniforms, they now donned white sheets and hoods. Never- 
theless, their purpose was the same-to challenge federal sover- 
eignty. During the Civil War, the southern military 
establishment declared that the federal goveniment had no 
authority over the southern states and seceded from the Union. 
After the war, the remnants of the southern military established 
an organization to carry on the mission of the former Confeder- 
acy-to deny the former slaves, their supporters, and union sym- 
pathizers all their constitutional rights. 
In the face of massive evidence of the breakdown of law and 
order in the southern states, Congress designed a bill that it 
("The rights, privileges, and immunities of the American citizen, secured to hi under the 
Constitution of the United States, are the subject-matter of this bid."); id app., at 188-89 
(remarks of Rep. Willard). For a thorough discussion of this issue, see generally Neil H. 
Cogan, Section 1985(3)3 Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texa History, Progress, 
and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515 (1987). 
63. Senator Morton said: 
When the war ended many men who had been in the Union Army remained in 
the South, intending to make it their home and identify themselves with its for- 
tunes. Others emigrated from the North, taking with them large capital . . . . 
This was th& right . . . but they were denounced as adventurers and intruders, 
and the odious slang of "carpet-baggers" was reechoed by the Democracy of the 
North, who sent word to the South that these men had no rights they were bound 
to respect. 
Emigration is a part of the genius'of the American people. . . . To emigrate 
from'state to State, and there to enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the Uni t9  States, is guarantied by the Constitution . . . . 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 253. 
64. Id app., at 47-48 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. app., at 216 (remarks of Sen. 
Thuman). 
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hoped would provide federal remedies for the deprivations of 
constitutional rights. During the debates, the proponents of the 
Ku Klux Klan Act expressed grave concerns about the safety 
and security of blacks, Republicans, northerners who moved 
south after the war, and native-born southerners who were loyal 
to the national government. Clearly, these groups were intended 
to come within the coverage of the statute since they had been 
targeted by the Klan. There is ample evidence, however, that 
Congress did not intend to limit the protection of the statute to 
only the groups that it identified in the debates. Congress sought 
to provide a remedy for any group that was singled out by an 
organization or individuals acting in a conspiracy to deprive that 
group of rights secured by the Constitution. The key factor was 
not the composition of the group; rather, it was the motivation 
of the conspirators. If the actions of the conspirators, motivated 
not out of a personal vendetta against another individual, but 
against a group as a whole, had the purpose or the effect of deny- 
ing constitutional rights, then such a conspiracy would come 
within the purview of $ 1985(3). There is no support for the 
theory that the statute was designed solely to protect blacks. 
In summary, throughout the debates, the rights that were to 
be protected under $ 1985(3) were foremost in the minds of the 
sponsors. Congress sought to protect all rights held by citizens 
under the Constitution. While the sponsors referred to the Thir- 
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as potential 
sources of Congress's power, no legislator sought to limit the 
reach of the Act to only those amendments. With respect to the 
equal protection clause of $ 1985(3), clearly Congress sought to 
vindicate Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the privileges 
and immunities clause of the statute, however, Congress sought 
to vindicate any right that a citizen had under any provision of 
the Constitution. As to the issue of whether the Act was 
designed to reach private or state actors, there is no indication in 
the legislative history that Congress intended $ 1985(3) to be 
limited solely to cases involving government  official^.^^ Thus, 
65. The view that 5 1985(3) was intended to reach private persons is buttressed when 
the statute is compared with 5 1983, which was originally section one of the Act. Whereas 
5 1983 explicitly contains a requirement that the person causing the constitutional depriva- 
tion acted "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory," 5 1985(3) contains no such provision. Thus, the debates regarding whether 
Congress had the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to punish individuals, the 
language used in 3 1985(3), and the other provisions of the larger Act, point to the conclu- 
sion that 5 1985(3) was intended to reach private actors. Additionally, the majority of the 
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when Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, it intended the 
statute to serve as a protector of the constitutional rights of all 
citizens against deprivations at the hands of private individuals. 
Despite that noble intention, the statute has never been accorded 
the scope that Congress intended. 
Since its enactment in 1871, 1985(3) has been of little util- 
ity because of a long string of cases incorrectly decided by the 
United States Supreme Court. From the nineteenth century to 
the present, the Court has been unwilling to allow the statute to 
serve the noble ends for which it was enacted-to provide a fed- 
eral remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights. The 
Court has limited the scope of the statute by imposing a state 
action req~irement,~~ a class-based animus prereq~isite,~~ and by 
circumscribing the classes of individuals that could rely on 
$j 1985(3) as a federal remedy.68 In the October 199 1 Term, the 
Court will have the opportunity to consider whether women or 
women seeking an abortion constitute an appropriate class under 
1985(3).69 The Court may also address the issue of which 
rights are protected under the statute. In this section, the cases 
interpreting § 1985(3) and the possible outcome of the Bray case 
will be discussed in light of the legislative history of the statute. 
A. United States v. Harris 
Until 1951, § 1985(3) lay dormant, in large part due to the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. HarrisY7O wherein 
the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) was declared unconstitu- 
tional.'l Harris involved an indictment under 5519 of twenty 
examples cited by the proponents of the statute involved deprivations at the hands of pri- 
vate individuals and not state actors. See GriiEn v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98-99 
(1971). 
66. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951). 
67. Gn%n, 403 U.S. at  102. 
68. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1983). 
69. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), 
cert. granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). 
70. 106 U.S. 629 (1882). 
71. Id at  641. When the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was enacted, section two had a 
criminal and civil component. Both remedies sought to punish deprivations of constitu- 
tional rights under the same set of circumstances, ie.,  conspiracies aimed at  depriving any 
person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immuni- 
ties under the laws. Id. at 632. When the United States Statutes were revised in 1874, the 
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men who removed four prisoners from jail and beat them.72 The 
Court considered the constitutionality of 5 5519 under the Thir- 
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth  amendment^.^^ 
With respect to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court 
acknowledged that Congress was empowered thereunder "to 
protect all persons within . . . the United States from being . . . 
subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punish- 
ment for crime."74 The Court also recognized that Congress had 
the power to enact legislation securing the equality guaranteed 
by the Thirteenth Amendment.75 The Court, however, viewed 
5 5519 as exceeding the scope of Congress's power under that 
Amendment. The fatal flaw in 5 5519 was that its reach was not 
solely limited to deprivations by whites of rights secured by the 
Thirteenth Amendment for the former slaves.76 Thus, unlike the 
Grz3n Court, the Harris Court saw no class-based animus 
requirement in the criminal counterpart to 5 1985(3). In fact, 
the Court concluded that under its terms, whites could be pro- 
tected as well as 
Additionally, the Court in Harris had little trouble declar- 
ing that 5 5519 exceeded Congress's power under the Four- 
teenth Amendment because that Amendment was directed at 
state action and private persons were subject to the provisions of 
5 5519.78 Similarly, the Court declared that the Fifteenth 
criminal provisions were codified as 3 5519 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74 and the civil 
counterpart was codified as 3 1980 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74. The civil provision 
was designated as 3 1985(3) in the 1979 United States Code. 
72. Harris, 106 U.S. at 630-31. 
73. Id at 636-37. 
74. Id at 640. 
75. Id 
76. The Court stated: 
Under that section it would be an offence for two or more white persons to con- 
spire . . . for the purpose of depriving another white person of the equal protection 
of the laws. It would be an offence for two or more colored persons, enfranchised 
slaves, to conspire with the same purpose against a white citizen or against 
another colored citizen who had never been a slave. 
Id at 641. 
77. Id 
78. According to the Court, 3 5519 was not limited 
to take effect only in case the State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, or deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the 
laws. It applies, no matter how well the State may have performed its duty. 
Under it private persons are liable to punishment for conspiring to deprive any 
one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State. 
Id. at 639. 
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Amendment could not provide Congress with a source of power 
to enact the statute since that Amendment related to the right to 
vote, and 5 5519 was "framed to protect from invasion by pri- 
vate persons, the equal privileges and immunities under the laws, 
of all persons and classes of persons.'y79 Having determined that 
the statute was not authorized under these amendments, the 
Court declared 8 5519 unconstit~tional.~~ 
The Harris Court partially recognized the purpose of sec- 
tion twos1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, but it did not adequately 
consider the legislative history of the Act in order to determine 
which rights Congress sought to protect. The Court was correct 
when it ruled that section two was intended to reach private 
action. The legislative history is replete with incidents of private 
marauders, not directly aided by the state, terrorizing certain 
segments of the southern population. The Court also correctly 
determined that the statute was designed to protect all classes of 
persons. 
With respect to the constitutionality of the statute, the 
Court misread the legislative history concerning which rights 
Congress sought to protect. The sponsors of the bill sought to 
protect all persons from deprivations of any rights secured by 
the Constitution. When discussing the privileges and immuni- 
ties clause of section two, the legislators made it clear that they 
did not intend to limit that clause solely to Fourteenth Amend- 
ment rights.82 They declared that whatever privileges and 
immunities a citizen had, those were to be protected by section 
Thus, under a broad reading of the statute, privileges and 
immunities flowing from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif- 
teenth Amendments or from any constitutional source could be 
protected under section two. Additionally, where there is inter- 
ference with a state official's duty to provide equal protection, 
which appears to have been the case in Harris, Congress would 
arguably have the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enact a statute to remedy such conduct.84 In fact, by its terms, 
section two created a claim where the conspirators prevented or 
79. Id. at 637. 
80. Id at 644. 
81. For purposes of clarity, in this section both 5 1985(3) and 5 5519 will be dis- 
cussed as section two of the Act. 
82. See supra notes 50-53, 61-64 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
84. The Court, in Collins, suggested that where private individuals seek to manipu- 
late state officials or to impede them in the performance of their duties, a conspiracy to 
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hindered a state officer from securing the equal protection of the 
law to all persons.85 Nevertheless, the Harris Court ignored the 
legislative history regarding the rights to be protected and nar- 
rowly interpreted the Constitution to declare the criminal con -  
terpart to § 1985(3) unconstitutional. 
B. Collins v. Hardyman 
After the decision in Harris, § 1985(3) was not invoked 
until 195 1. In Collins v. HardymanYs6 it was alleged that a group 
of individuals, opposed to the political views and opinions of a 
California political club, conspired for the purpose of preventing 
the club from holding a meeting to discuss and adopt a resolu- 
tion opposed to the Marshall Plan.87 The conspirators went to 
the meeting, assaulted the members of the club, and used other 
violent means to break up the meeting. The plaintiffs contended 
that their rights to assemble peaceably and petition the federal 
government for redreis of grievances were violated by the con- 
sp i ra tor~ .~~ Thus, they sued under § 1985(3).89 
Although the plaintiffs alleged no Fourteenth Amendment 
violations, in a 6-3 decision, the Court considered the statute as 
an enactment pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment 
powers. The Court noted that 
[slince the decision . . . in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle 
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the 
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment is only such action as may f&ly be said to be that of the 
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely pri- 
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.g0 
In the Court's view, the Fourteenth Amendment protected indi- 
viduals from state action and not against wrongs by other indi- 
viduals. After concluding that only state action could run afoul 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and considering the statute in 
question as solely an exercise of Congress's powers under that 
Amendment, the Court, constrained by its own limited analysis 
of the source of Congress's power to enact 5 1985(3), held that 
deprive another person of equal protection of the laws would fall within the ambit of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1951). 
85. See supra notes 8, 22. 
86. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). 
87. Id at 653. 
88. Id. at 654-55. 
89. Id. at 653-54. 
90. Id. at 658 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (citation omitted). 
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state officials must be involved in a conspiracy to deprive 
another person of the constitutional rights protected by the stat- 
~ t e . ~ l  Private persons acting without state cooperation or partic- 
ipation could not violate the statute.92 The dissent took issue 
with the majority's limited view of the power of Congress to 
enact a statute that proscribed private conduct violative of con- 
stitutional rights. Justice Burton, joined by Justices Black and 
Douglas, believed that Congress had the power, separate and 
apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, to protect constitu- 
tional rights from deprivations by private persons.93 The dissent 
contended that this is what Congress had done when it enacted 
§ 1985(3).94 
While the majority viewed 5 1985(3) as solely an exercise of 
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the dis- 
sent, consistent with the legislative history of the statute, viewed 
it as protecting a far broader category of rights than those delin- 
eated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whereas rights flowing 
from that Amendment can only be violated by state conduct, the 
dissent alluded to another set of rights that could be invaded by 
private persons. Among those rights was the right to petition 
peaceably the federal government for redress of grie~ances.~' 
91. Id at 655. 
92. Id at 655, 658-59, 661. 
93. Id at 664 (Burton, J., Black, J., Douglas, J., dissenting). 
94. Id at 663-64. 
95. Id at 663. Other constitutional rights that are protected from invasion by private 
individuals are the federal right to free access to the seat of government, Crandall v. 
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-44 (1867); the right peaceably to assemble to petition the 
government, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,552 (1875) ('The right of the people 
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances 
. . . in an attribute of national citizenship. . . ."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36,79 (1872); the right of protection from attack while in the custody of a federal marshall, 
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285 (1892), the right to inform federal officers of 
violations of federal law, In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895); the right to interstate 
travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757-60 (1966); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
at 79-80; CrandaN, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44, 48-49. 
Congress's power to protect persons against deprivations by private individuals of the 
rights of national citizenship is implied from the Constitution and is not derived from any 
particular provision. See, cg., Daniel P. Sheehan & Robert D. Rapp, The Scope and Appli- 
cation of 42 USC § 1985(3): Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment Question, 2 A N n o c ~  
L.J. 131, 145-47 (1982); Marilyn R. Walter, Zhe Ku Klux Klan Act and the State Action 
Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 3, 50-52 (1985). 
It is well established that Congress has the power to legislate for the protection of 
these fundamental rights against private interference. See, eg. ,  Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.17 
("[Tlhe constitutional right of interstate travel is a right secured against interference from 
any source whatever, whether governmental or private."); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 
347,362-64 (1915); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536-37; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 
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The majority ignored this point and limited the scope of the stat- 
ute to Fourteenth Amendment deprivations, thereby emasculat- 
ing § 1985(3) by removing from its penumbra private conduct 
violating constitutional rights. Although the allegations in Har- 
ris clearly came within the category of constitutional rights that 
Congress has the power to protect against the invasion of private 
actors, the Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim 
under 8 1985(3). 
C Griffin v. Breckenridge 
The Court revisited 8 1985(3) in 1971, one hundred years 
after the statute's enactment. G n s n  v. Breckenridge 96 involved 
a racial incident in Mississippi reminiscent of the type of con- 
duct that formed part of the motivation for the passage of the 
law originally.97. The plaintiffs alleged that the white defendants 
had entered a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving them of 
certain rights secured by the Constituti~n.~~ Those rights 
included the right to freedom of speech, movement, and assem- 
bly, the right to petition the government for redress of griev- 
ances, the right to be secure in their persons and their homes, 
and the right not to be enslaved. It was alleged that the conspir- 
ators had injured the plaintiffs and deprived them of the afore- 
mentioned rights in violation of § 1985(3).99 On the basis of 
Collins, the court of appeals ailinned the district court's dismis- 
sal of the complaint.loO 
284 (1892); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 
U.S. 651, 665 (1884); see also Howard M .  Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal 
Power to Punkh Private Individuals for Interference with Federally Secured Rights, 19 
VAND. L. REV. 641, 651-65 (1966). 
96. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
97. The facts in Gn3n were remarkably similar to the Klan's activities in the nine- 
teenth century. The plaintiffs, black citizens of Mississippi, allleged that they were travel- 
ling in a vehicle on federal, state, and local highways, when a group of whites attacked 
them in the mistaken belief that the black passengers were civil rights workers. Id at 89- 
92. 
98. Id 
99. Id at 92. 
100. Gri5n v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 826 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 88 
(1971). The court of appeals questioned the soundness of Collins but noted that it was 
required to follow the Collins Court's holding that only conspiracies under color of law 
could be reached under 5 1985(3). Id The court also considered plaintiffs' non-Four- 
teenth Amendment claims, such as the right to interstate travel, as potentially viable, since 
those claims did not require state action. The court was constrained, however, by the hold- 
ing in Collins that Congress did not intend for the statute to reach those claims. Id. at 822- 
23. 
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With respect to the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court 
avoided explicitly overruling Collins by noting that in that case 
the Court had not based its decision on constitutional grounds, 
but upon a construction of the statute itself.lo1 The Court did 
note that the Collins majority had observed that if the complaint 
alleging a private conspiracy was construed as meeting the 
requirements of the statute, serious constitutional issues would 
have been raised. Nevertheless, the GnBn Court held that 
many of the constitutional problems noted in Collins no longer 
existed because of the evolution of decisional law since that case 
was decided.lo2 
Freed from the constraints of Collins, the Court, turned its 
attention to identifying a source for Congress's power to enact a 
statute banning private conspiracies that violated constitutional 
rights. The Thirteenth Amendment, the Court concluded, 
authorized Congress to legislate against private individuals. The 
Court observed that "there has never been any doubt of the 
power of Congress to impose liability on private persons" under 
that Amendment.lo3 The Thirteenth Amendment not only pro- 
hibited state laws upholding slavery, Congress was also given the 
power "rationally to determine . . . the badges and the incidents 
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into 
effective legislation."'" Based upon its Thirteenth Amendment 
analysis, the Court held that Congress was "wholly within its 
powers under . . . the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statu- 
tory cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the vic- 
tims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action 
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures 
to all free men."105 While upholding the statute under the Thir- 
teenth Amendment, the Court expressly chose not to consider its 
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.lo6 
101. Gri5n v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,94 (1971). While technically the Court was 
correct, the dissent in Collins suggested that the majority had decided that 8 1985(3) had 
been enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers. Collins v. Hardy- 
man, 341 U.S. 651,663 (1951) (Burton, J., Black, J., Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly, the 
court of appeals in Gniffin implied that Collins had construed the statute as enforcing solely 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Griffin, 410 F.2d at 819. 
102. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96. 
103. Id at 104-05; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-40 
(1968) (holding that Congress may pass laws regulating the acts of private individuals pur- 
suant to the Thirteenth Amendment in order to eliminate all racial discrimination). 
104. Gniffin, 403 U.S. at 105 (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 440). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 107. 
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Additionally, the Court stated that the statute protected 
rights that did not rest on either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment and that Congress was empowered to enact such 
legislation.lo7 The Court held that the right to interstate travel 
was constitutionally protected against private and governmental 
interference and that it was recognized as one of the rights and 
privileges of national citizenship. log 
Having identified two sources of Congress's power to legis- 
late to prohibit private persons from denying constitutional 
rights, the Court scrutinized the allegations of the complaint to 
see if a proper 5 1985(3) claim had been alleged.lo9 With respect 
to the Thirteenth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs had alleged 
that one of the rights violated by the conspirators was their right 
not to be ens1aved.ll0 The Court held that a conspiracy aimed at 
depriving blacks of the rights the laws secured to all free persons 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment."' As to the right to inter- 
state travel claim, the Court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that 
one of the purposes of the conspiracy was to deprive them of 
their right to travel the public highways.l12 This violated the 
privileges and immunities section of the Act. Thus, on the basis 
of the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiffs had established 
a claim under both of the constitutional sources of power identi- 
fied by the Court.l13 
In GrzBn, the Court gave 5 1985(3) a reading more consis- 
tent with its legislative history, but nevertheless prevented the 
statute from having as broad an impact as was originally 
intended. The Court correctly determined that the statute was 
not limited by the Fourteenth Amendment's state action con- 
straints. Instead, the statute could be used, as its sponsors 
intended, to vindicate privileges and immunities that had as their 
source the Thirteenth Amendment or the fundamental rights of 
national citizenship. Nevertheless, the Court, concerned that 
5 1985(3) could become a general federal tort law, read into the 
statute a requirement that the Harris and Collins courts had not. 
The GrzBn Court, in order to avoid the broad reach of the lan- 
guage of the statute, replaced the state action requirement with a 
107. Id. at 104. 
108. Id at 105-06; see supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
109. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 
110. Id at 91. 
111. Id. at 105. 
112. Id at 103. 
113. Id. at 102-03. 
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class-based animus element. The Court concluded that, in order 
to make out a claim under the statute, a plaintiff had to prove 
that there was a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidi- 
ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."u4 
The Court declined to decide whether a conspiracy motivated by 
invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be 
actionable despite evidence that the sponsors of the bill intended 
it to reach more than racial classes.115 In fact, the sponsors 
made clear that they intended the statute to protect those who 
had been deprived of their constitutional rights due to their 
political views, religious beliefs, and regional origins, as well as 
racial status. 
Another difEculty created by the Court's insertion of a 
racially based, class animus prerequisite was whether that 
requirement solely pertained to claims based on violations of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Arguably, if a claim was based on that 
Amendment, some racial animus would have to be demon- 
strated, since slavery in the United States was based on race. 
The question is whether such would be the case if the rights 
sought to be protected emanated from other constitutional 
- - - -  
114. Id at  102. 
115. Id at  102 n.9. In this regard, the Court made reference to the remarks of Sena- 
tor Edmunds wherein he stated that: 
We do not undertake in this bi to interfere with what might be called a private 
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against 
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for 
burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this con- 
spiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, . . . or because 
he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a 
Vermonter, (which is a pretty painful instance that I have in my mind in the State 
of Florida within a few days where a man lost his life for that reason) then this 
section would reach it. 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 567. Senator Morton remarked: 
If there be organizations in any of the States having for their purpose to deny to 
any class or condition of men equal protection, to deny to them the equal enjoy- 
ment of rights that are secured by the Constitution of the United States, it is the 
right and duty of Congress to make such organizations and combinations an 
offense against the United States . . . . 
Id. app., at 251; see id at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) ("Llarge numbers of our fellow 
citizens are deprived of the . . . fundamental rights of citizens . . . because of their attach- 
ment to their country, their loyalty to its flag, or because their opinions on questions of 
public interest coincide with those of a majority of the American people."); id app., at 311 
(remarks of Rep. Maynard) ("[Tlhe unpopular man, the man who entertains odious senti- 
ments, the man whose religion . . . is at variance with the common belief, the man whose 
political views do not accord with the generally received opinions of the community in 
which he resides, finds his personal security . . . in peril . . . ."); see also supra notes 43-47 
and accompanying text. 
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sources, such as the fundamental rights of national citizen- 
ship.l16 The Grzzn Court was silent on this question. It was 
this silence as to the types of classes that came within the protec- 
tion of the statute and whether all claims involving deprivations 
of constitutional rights would require class-based animus that 
led to further confusion regarding the scope of the statute. 
D. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott 
In 1983, the Court re-examined 5 1985(3) and attempted to 
grapple with some of the issues left unresolved in Grzzn. Specif- 
ically, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,l17 
the Court addressed whether classes other than racial groups 
were entitled to relief under the statute and what rights, other 
than Thirteenth Amendment rights, could form the basis for a 
claim under 5 1985(3).11* In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
a proper claim could be based on non-Thirteenth Amendment 
rights (here the First Amendment), but re-injected the state 
action requirement of Collins.llg The Court also chose to nar- 
rowly limit the types of classes entitled to sue under 5 1985(3). 
Scott involved mob violence during the course of a labor 
dispute. 120 A construction company (A.A. Cross Construction 
Co., Inc.) hired nonunion employees for a construction job in 
Port Arthur, Texas. These employees, some of whom were from 
outside the Port Arthur area, were threatened by local residents, 
who told them that Port Arthur was a union town and that the 
company's hiring of nonunion workers would cause trouble.121 
A citizens' protest was organized by a local union. Truckloads 
of men went to the job site, "assaulted and beat Cross employ- 
116. The Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), a case involving an 
indictment under 18 U.S.C. $241 and alleging a conspiracy to deprive blacks of the free 
exercise and enjoyment of rights secured to them by the Constitution, held that: 
mf the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exer- 
cise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise 
of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the con- 
spiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in 
this case was brought. 
Id at 760. A similar conclusion should be reached when a claim alleging deprivation of the 
right of interstate travel is asserted under $ 1985(3). Otherwise, blacks would have their 
rights to such travel protected by the statute, but whites would be at the mercy of the mob 
or those who sought to interfere with such rights. 
117. 463 U.S. 825 (1983). 
118. Id at 835. 
119. Id at 834. 
120. Id at 828. 
121. Id 
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ees, and burned and destroyed construction equipment. "122 sev- 
eral employees filed suit under 5 1985(3), alleging that the mob 
had conspired against them because they refused to join a union 
and that the conspirators had denied the plaintiffs their First 
Amendment associational rights.123 
The majority confronted the constitutional issue by discuss- 
ing whether the statute was limited to protecting Thirteenth 
Amendment rights alone.124 The Court re-afErmed Grz&7nYs 
holding that the statute protected rights other than Thirteenth 
Amendment rights.12' Among the rights protected was the right 
of interstate travel. The Court concluded that 5 1985(3) pro- 
tected those rights from interference by purely private conspira- 
The Court was of a different view, however, concerning 
whether the statute provided a remedy for the deprivation of 
Fourteenth and First Amendment rights in the absence of state 
involvement. 
With respect to the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, the 
majority observed that such claims were only actionable if the 
state was involved in the conspiracy or if the aim of the conspir- 
acy was to influence the activity of the state.'=' This conclusion 
was based on the Court's declaration that First Amendment 
rights were protected against state incursion through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state conduct and not that of 
individuals.lZ8 The Court avoided overruling Gri$?nYs holding 
that there was no state action requirement in 5 1985(3) by distin- 
guishing the rights infringed upon in Grzzn from those asserted 
in Scott. The Court stated that the rights involved in Grzsn, 
Thirteenth Amendment rights and rights of national citizenship, 
were properly protected against private conspiracies, but the 
Scott Court held that GnPn had not categorically stated "that 
even when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is by 
definition a right that is only against state interference the plain- 
tiff. . . need not prove . . . state involvement of some 
While the majority did acknowledge that the complaint in Grif- 
122. Id. at 827-28. 
123. Id at 828. 
124. Id at 832-33. 
125. Id at 832. 
126. Id at 832-33. 
127. Id at 830-31. 
128. Id 
129. Id at 833. 
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fin had alleged a deprivation of First Amendment rights, the 
action was not sustained on that basis.130 
After resurrecting the state action requirement of Collins, 
the Court turned its attention to the types of classes protected 
under the statute. With respect to the categories of classes pro- 
tected under the statute, the majority in Scott was of a mind to 
limit it solely to racial groups, but chose not to go that far.131 
The Court opined, without citation to the legislative history or 
its own precedent, that the "predominant purpose of § 1985(3) 
was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their 
s~pporters."'~~ The Court acknowledged that there was evi- 
dence that the statute was designed to have a broader reach, but 
declined to give that evidence any weight.133 Furthermore, the 
majority stated that the GrzBn Court was aware of this evidence 
and did not base its definition of the categories of classes pro- 
tected by the statute on it.134 The Court concluded that even if 
the statute was designed to reach conspiracies "aimed at any 
class . . . on account of its political views or activities, or at any 
of the classes posited by Senator Edmunds, we find no convinc- 
ing support in the legislative history . . . that the provision was 
intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others 
on account of their economic views, status, or a~tivities."'~' 
Thus, the Court held that 8 1985(3) could not reach conspiracies 
motivated by economic animus.136 
130. Id While the Court may have been correct regarding the treatment of the First 
Amendment claims in G n s n ,  the dissent in Collinr was prepared to find a violation of 
5 1985(3) based on the First Amendment in the absence of state involvement of any kind. 
Collins v. Hardpan, 341 U.S. 651, 663 (1951). 
131. The Court stated: "mt is a close question whether 5 1985(3) was intended to 
reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who champi- 
oned their cause, most notably Republicans." Scott, 463 U.S. at 836. 
132. Id 
133. The Court quoted Senator Edmunds' statement that "if a conspiracy were 
formed against a man 'because he was a Democrat. . . or because he was a Catholic, . . . or 
because he was a Vermonter . . . then this section could reach it.' " Id at 837; see also 
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Although Senator Edmunds was the Senate 
floor manager of the bid, the Court refused to accord his views any weight because 
"5 1985(3). . . [in] its present form, was proposed, debated and adopted. . . [in the House], 
and the Senate made only technical changes to the bid." Scott, 463 U.S. at 837. 
134. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837. In fact, the reason for the GnBn Court's refusal to 
decide this issue was that it was not necessary, based on the facts of that case, to reach it. 
The G n s n  Court stated that "[wle need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether a 
conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be 
actionable under. . . 5 1985(3)." Grifiin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9 (1971). 
135. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837. 
136. Id at 838. 
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The dissent took the majority to task for its conclusions 
that the statute had a state action requirement under certain cir- 
cumstances and that it was designed to reach only racial classes. 
First, the dissent relied extensively on the legislative history to 
refute the majority's conclusion regarding state a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
According to the dissent, the Republican supporters of the stat- 
ute held two views of Congress's power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.138 The radical Republicans believed that the Four- 
teenth Amendment had altered the balance of power between 
the states and the national government and that Congress was 
empowered to enact legislation to protect life, liberty, and prop- 
erty. 139 The moderate Republicans thought that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Gual  Protection Clause implied that the states 
had an alknative duty to afford equal protection.14 When the 
state neglected or refused to provide equal protection, Congress 
was empowered to step in and punish all persons, private or offi- 
cial, who deprived another of constitutional rights.141 The dis- 
sent believed that these comments, and others relied upon in its 
opinion,142 supported the conclusion that the statute was 
designed to protect persons who were the victims of "private 
conspiracies motivated by the intent to interfere in the equal 
exercise and enjoyment of their legal rights"143 and that Con- 
gress did not intend any state action req~irement.'~~ 
Having concluded that there was no state action require- 
ment in § 1985(3), the dissent sharply criticized the majority for 
adopting a prereq$site of state involvement virtually identical to 
137. Id at 841-47 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
138. Id at 842-43. 
139. Id at 842; see, ag., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 73 (remarks of Rep. 
Blair); id app., at 85 (remarks of Rep. Bigham); id app., at 141 (remarks of Rep. 
Shanks); see also supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
140. Scott, 463 U.S. at 843 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield)); 
see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
141. Scott, 463 U.S. at 843 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
142. The dissent relied on the additional comments of Representative Garfield, 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 153 (an equal protection claim is established when 
the state refuses to enforce the provisions of its own laws); Representative Shellabarger, id. 
at 478 (the object of the statute was to prevent deprivations which attacked the equality of 
rights of American citizens); and Representative Willard, id. app., at 188 (the statute was 
designed to punish a denial of equality). See Scott, 463 U.S. at 843-46 (Blackmun, J., 
Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
143. Scott, 463 U.S. at 847 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
144. Id 
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that of the Collins Court.145 The dissent also noted that the Har- 
ris Court had held that the statute reached private conspira- 
~ies."+~ Additionally, they stated that Grzzn expressly rejected 
any suggestion found in Collins that there was a state action 
requirement in § 1985(3).14' 
Finally, the dissent disparaged the majority's refusal to 
extend the protections of 1985(3) beyond racial classes.148 
They acknowledged that the types of classes covered by the stat- 
ute were un~1ear.l~~ Under their reading of the language of 
1985(3), however, it could include a wide variety of class-based 
denials of equal protection and equal enjoyment of rights. 
Reviewing the legislative history, the dissent reached the conclu- 
sion that the forty-second Congress viewed the Klan as a polit- 
ical organization whose violence was premised on the political 
viewpoints of its victims.150 The Klan's goal was to overthrow 
the Reconstruction policy of Congress in order to place Demo- 
crats in office. Blacks were clearly victimized by the Klan's use 
of terror, but according to the dissent, this was because of the 
identification of blacks with the Republican Party and 
Reconstr~ction.~~~ 
Based on the legislative history, the dissent was of the view 
145. Id at 848-49. 
146. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1882) ("Under . . . [ S )  1985(3)] pri- 
vate persons are liable to punishment for conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protec- 
tion of the laws. . . ."); c j  United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 76 (1951) (plurality 
opinion) (!indig similar conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. 8 241, reaches private action). 
147. Scott, 463 U.S. at 849-50 (Blackmun, J., Breman, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). In rejecting a state action requirement, the Gnfin Court relied upon other 
provisions of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the legislative history. The Court postulated three 
possible forms for a state action limitation and concluded that each had been covered under 
other provisions of the Act. With respect to a possible requirement that the action of the 
conspirators be under color of state law, the Court concluded that section one of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act (currently codified as 42 U.S.C. S )  1983 (1988)) covered that situation, and 
that to read such a requirement into S )  1985(3) would deprive that section of all independ- 
ent effect. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971). Similarly, another clause of 
S )  1985(3) provided a remedy where the conspirators sought to interfere with or influence 
state authorities. Finally, section three of the Act provided for military action at the com- 
mand of the president where massive private lawlessness .rendered state authorities power- 
less. Id at 98-99. Thus, from a statutory construction analysis, the Court found no basis 
for implying a state action limitation on S )  1985(3). The legislative history that the Gr@n 
Court reviewed led to a similar conclusion. Id. at 100-01. 
148. Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., Breman, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 850-51; see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
151. Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 n.15 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
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that Congress intended to provide a federal remedy for all 
classes whose rights were violated in circumstances similar to 
those of the victims of Klan vi01ence.l~~ They contended that 
the forty-second Congress enacted 8 1985(3) because of its per- 
ception that the Klan was committing atrocities against persons 
who, "largely because of their political affiliation, were unable to 
demand protection from local law enforcement  official^.""^ 
Accordingly, the statute wak designed to provide a remedy "to 
any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in 
danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local 
a~thori t ies ."~~~ The dissent concluded that although "certain 
class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin" met 
this requirement per se, "other traits also may implicate the 
functional concerns" of the statute "in particular  situation^."'^^ 
Thus, the dissent would have found the nonunion employees in 
Scott a cognizable class under 5 1985(3). 
On one hand, the Scott Court upheld the holding of G n z n  
that non-Thirteenth Amendment rights were actionable under 
5 1985(3). This view of the statute is supported by the legislative 
history wherein the sponsors of the bill stated that their intent 
was to protect all privileges and immunities that a citizen had 
under any provision of the Constit~tion."~ By requiring state 
action when certain constitutional rights were alleged to have 
been infringed upon, however, the Scott Court resurrected Col- 
lins and threw the continued vitality of the statute into question. 
The G n z n  Court had demonstrated adequately that when 
the statute was read in its original context, it became obvious 
that a state action limitation would make 5 1985(3) superflu- 
ous."' The legislative history demonstrates that the cause for 
Congress's concern was not that state officials were actively 
denying constitutional rights. Instead, Congress was concerned 
that private actors had taken the law into their own hands and, 
thereby, prevented state officials from affording equal protection 
to all classes.M8 These persons, at times acting under the aegis of 
the Klan, used intimidation, terror, and violence in pursuit of 
their political objective's. Thus, the Scott dissent correctly con- 
- -- 
152. Id. at 851. 
153. Id. at 853. 
154. Id 
155. Id. 
156. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
157. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98-99, 100-01 (1971). 
158. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
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cluded that the purpose of the statute was to provide a remedy 
against private individuals who infringed on constitutional 
rights. Additionally, the dissent correctly described the factual 
situation in the South in 1871 wherein blacks, and others with 
unpopular views, were unable to acquire protection from local 
law enforcement, either because the Klan had entered into a 
tacit agreement with the state officials, or because they were 
powerless to stop the Klan. Thus, the primary purpose of the 
statute was to provide a remedy against the acts of private per- 
sons, and not against the acts of the state. 
Finally, the Scott Court's refusal to extend the scope of 
classes protected under the statute is inconsistent with the legis- 
lative history. The forty-second Congress was concerned with 
attacks against blacks, their supporters, Republicans, religious 
figures, northerners, southern union sympathizers, and'symbols 
of the federal government.15g There was ample evidence that 
Congress was concerned with the deprivation of rights against a 
wide variety of individuals, and the Court in Harris had so con- 
~1uded . l~~  Thus, a proper view of the statute would be that when 
a group is attacked or its members deprived of their constitu- 
tional rights because of an identifiable group characteristic such 
as race, sex, national origin, or political views that the conspira- 
tors oppose, 5 1985(3) should provide a remedy. Additionally, 
where a conspiracy seeks to deny to others their constitutionally 
secured right to interstate travel, or any other fundamental right 
of national citizenship, no showing of class-based animus should 
be required.161 
E. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic 
In the October 1991 Term, the Supreme Court will have 
another opportunity to clarify or to restrict further the reach of 
8 1985(3).162 In Bray, the court of appeals afErmed the district 
court's issuance of a permanent injunction under 8 1985(3) 
preventing Operation Rescue and several individual members 
from blockading, trespassing, or otherwise preventing access to 
159. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
160. The Harris Court stated that "[u]nder [§ 1985(3)] it would be an offence for two 
or more white persons to conspire. . . for the purpose of depriving another white person of 
the equal protection of the laws." United States v. Hams, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1882). 
161. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). 
162. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), 
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abortion fa~i1ities.l~~ The Fourth Circuit also upheld the district 
court's finding that gender-based discrimination satisfied the 
class-based animus requirement of 1985(3) and that Operation 
Rescue and the other defendants had violated the right of 
women to travel inter~tate. '~~ 
In Bray, the Court is presented with several options. One, 
it could declare that GrzBn was decided incorrectly and hold 
that Collins's state action requirement applies to all claims 
asserted under § 1985(3). Two, it could hold that women or 
women seeking an abortion do not constitute a valid class for 
$ 1985(3) purposes. Three, it could undercut the right of 
women to an abortion by ruling that § 1985(3) was not intended 
to protect women seeking an abortion, since the evil to be reme- 
died by Congress was Klan terror against blacks and their sup- 
porters. However, a careful review of the facts presented by the 
case, the legislative history of 1985(3), and the Court's prece- 
dent under that statute should result in the affirmance of the 
opinions of the lower courts. 
In the district court, the plaintiffs included nine clinics that 
provided abortions and abortion counselling to residents of the 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.165 Five organizations also 
sued on behalf of their members. Among the organizational 
plaintiffs were the National Organization for Women and 
Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Opera- 
tion Rescue and several of its members were named as defend- 
ants. The district court found that Operation Rescue was an 
unincorporated association whose members oppose abortion and 
its legalization. The organization and its members would 
blockade an abortion clinic's entrances and exits, thereby effec- 
cert granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 11 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). 
Among the issues presented by the petition for certiorari are the following: 
1. Whether women seeking abortions constitute a class for the purpose of the class- 
based animus requirement of § 1985(3). 
2. Whether opposition to abortion is discrimination per se against women for the 
purpose of satisfying the class-based animus requirement of the statute. 
3. Whether purely private actors who hinder access to abortion facilities violate the 
constitutional right to interstate travel because some of the facility's patients travel 
interstate. 
163. National Org. for Women, 914 F.2d at 585. 
164. Id. at 584-85. 
165. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (E.D. 
Va. 1989), af'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cu. 1990), cert. granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, 11 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). 
166. Id. 
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tively closing the facility and denying women access.167 
The district court found that the purpose of Operation Res- 
cue's blockading of abortion clinics was to disrupt operations at 
those facilities and to cause the clinic to cease operation entirely. 
By disrupting these clinics, the defendants hoped to "prevent 
abortions," "dissuade women from seeking a clinic's abortion 
services," and "to impress upon members of society the . . . 
intensity of their anti-abortion views."168 The court found that 
the practice of preventing access to these facilities could be 
harmful to the health of women seeking or undergoing abortion- 
related treatment.169 In addition to the risk to the physical 
health of the patients, the court concluded that these blockades 
could impose stress, anxiety, and mental harm to patients or 
potential patients.170 
The court also found that substantial numbers of women 
seeking abortions in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area 
traveled interstate to reach the clinics. 171 The court held that the 
blockading of abortion clinics had the effect of "obstructing and 
interfering with the interstate travel of these women."172 The 
court further found that Operation Rescue was able to close 
down clinics notwithstanding the efforts of the local police to 
prevent the clinics from being c10sed.l~~ The court found that 
167. Id 
168. Id. at 1488. 
169. The court found that for some women who elect to undergo an abortion, a pre- 
abortion laminaria is inserted to achieve proper cervical dilation. In order to avoid infec- 
tion, such devices must be removed in a timely fashion. If the defendants closed a facility, 
women seeking laminaria removal would be placed at  risk or would have to seek services 
elsewhere. Id at 1489. There were numerous economic and psychological barriers to 
obtaining these services elsewhere. The court found that indigent or impecunious patients 
were provided abortion services at  nominal fees by the clinics, whereas hospitals would 
require insurance or full payment. Id Thus, for these women, Operation Rescue's block- 
ade of an abortion facility could impose serious health risks. 
170. Id 
171. Approximately 20-30% of the patients served at  the Commonwealth Women's 
Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia, came from out of state. The records of these patients 
revealed they had permanent residences in Maryland, the District of Columbia, Penn- 
sylvania, Texas, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Florida. A majority of the 
patients at the Hillview Women's Center in Forestville, Maryland, traveled interstate to 
reach the clinic. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. To support this conclusion, the court relied on trial testimony relating to the 
closing of the Commonwealth Women's Clinic. The clinic had been the object of Opera- 
tion Rescue's blockades on almost a weekly basis for five years prior to the litigation. On 
October 29, 1988, the clinic was closed by the blockade despite the efforts of the Falls 
Church Police Department to keep the facility open. The testimony revealed that the 
department consisted of thirty deputized officers. On the date in question, the blockaders 
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"[llimited police department resources combined with the typi- 
cal absence of any advance notice identifying a target clinic ren- 
ders it difficult for local police to prevent rescuers from closing a 
facility."174 
After determining that the defendants engaged in conduct 
that could result in a deprivation of constitutional rights, the 
court analyzed the facts to ascertain whether a 5 1985(3) viola- 
tion was established. The court found that gender-based dis- 
crimination satisfied the class-based discriminatory animus 
element of the statute.175 Thus, a conspiracy to deprive women 
seeking abortions of their right to travel interstate to obtain such 
services was actionable under the statute.176 Based on its factual 
findings, the court concluded that the defendants had engaged in 
a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving women seeking abor- 
tions or related medical services of the right to travel inter- 
state.177 The court further found that since the right to travel 
interstate is protected against purely private as well as govern- 
mental interference, there was no need to show state a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
Although the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had vio- 
lated the privacy rights of women seeking abortions, the court 
declined to base its decision on that ground.179 Having f o u d  
outnumbered the police officers, and, even though 240 arrests were made, the clinic was 
closed for more than six hours. Id. at 1489 n.4. 
174. Id. 
175. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the majority of courts have 
concluded that gender-based animus satisfies the conspiracy requirement of the statute. Id. 
at 1492; see, ag., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 
F.2d 1240,1257 (4th Cir. 1985); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577,581 (E.D. Pa. 
1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1259 
(S.D.N.Y.), a r d ,  886 F.2d 1339 (2d Ci. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Port- 
land Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Lie, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 @. 
Or. 1988). 
176. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1493. 
177. Id at 1492-93. 
178. Id 
179. The plaintiffs contended that the conspiracy infringed on the constitutional right 
of women to obtain an abortion. The court stated that "[wlhere the claimed abortion right 
is a penumbral privacy right emanating from the First Amendment, state action must be 
shown to support a claim under Section 1985(3)." Id at 1493 n.11; accord United Bhd. of 
Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983); see also New York State Nat'l 
Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating requirement that 
state action must be demonstrated when the right asserted is a guarantee against govern- 
ment interference), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). The district court acknowledged 
that there was authority for the proposition that where conspirators render local police 
officials "incapable of securing equal access to medical treatment for women who choose 
abortions," the state action requirement is satisfied. National Org. for Women, 726 F. 
Supp. at 1493 n.11; see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 
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that the plaintiffs had established a violation of 8 1985(3), the 
court issued a permanent injunction against the defendants 
preventing them from further blockades of certain Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan area abortion clinics.1s0 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion and 
the issuance of the permanent injunction. The circuit court 
agreed that gender-based animus satisfied the purpose element of 
8 1985(3) and stated that such a conclusion was consistent with 
the law of other circuits.181 The circuit court also upheld the 
district court's conclusion that blocking access to medical serv- 
ices provided by abortion facilities that serve an interstate clien- 
tele violates the constitutional right to interstate trave1.lS2 
The granting of the petition for certiorari in Bray presents 
the Court with the opportunity either to interpret 5 1985(3) con- 
sistently with the intent of the forty-second Congress and the 
Court's own precedent or to unsettle an entire body of law. 
Essentially, there are two major issues presented by this case. 
First, whether women or women seeking an abortion constitute 
384 (1979) ("mf private persons take conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the 
constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing equal treatment, the private 
persons would cause those authorities to violate the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."); c j  
Scott, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Congress intended to provide a remedy 
to any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving 
equal protection of the laws from local authorities."). The district court declined to reach 
the merits of this argument, in part because of its conclusion that the right to an abortion is 
in flux. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494; see, ag., Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,518 (1989) ("We have not refrained from reconsideration of a 
prior construction of the Constitution that has proved 'unsound in principle and unwork- 
able in practice.' We think the Roe trimester framework falls into that category.") (cita- 
tions omitted); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 421 
(1983); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
180. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1496-97. Other courts have similarly 
enjoined blockades of abortion clinics. See, eg., Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 432 
(N.D.N.Y. 1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 704 F. 
Supp. 1247, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577,589 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989); Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 382-83 (D. 
Conn. 1989); Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 
1987). 
181. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585-86 (4th Cir. 
1990), cert. granted sub nom , Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 11 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991); 
see, ag., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Teny, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434'(7th Cir. 
1988); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15,20 (lst Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 
(1979); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979); Conroy v. 
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cu. 1978). 
182. National Otg for Women, 914 F.2d at 585; accord New York State Nat'l Org. for 
Women, 886 F.2d at 1360-61. 
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a proper class for protection under 5 1985(3). Second, whether 
the statute was designed to provide a remedy for deprivations of 
the fundamental rights of national citizenship. 
Grzzn held that an essential element of a 5 1985(3) claim 
was that the defendants must act upon some class-based, invidi- 
ously discriminatory basis.lS3 Because that case involved a con- 
spiracy by a group of whites against blacks traveling on the 
highways of Mississippi, the Court chose not to speculate as to 
the parameters of the class-based animus requirement. The 
majority in Scott opined that only racial classes were protected 
under the statute, but declined to limit the reach of 5 1985(3) so 
narrowly.lS4 The dissent in Scott stated that a conspiracy 
against women would be actionable under the statute,lS5 and a 
number of circuits have so concluded.186 A possible rule as to 
the types of classes that would come within the purview of 
5 1985(3) would be that where the class consists of members 
who have been subjected to discriminatory treatment as a group, 
the class-based requirement would be satisfied. Clearly, women 
as a group have been subjected to discriminatory treatment in 
many different contexts.lS7 As Justice Brennan stated in 
Frontiero : 
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such 
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic 
paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage. 
183. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). 
184. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37. 
185. Id. at 853 (Blackrnun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
186. See supra note 181. 
187. In 1872, the Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting women from practicing 
law. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). During the Burger years, the 
Court struck down a number of gender-based discriminatory classifications as violating the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, eg., Califano v. Westcott, 
443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (difference in benefits based on gender of unemployed spouse); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (state law giving unwed mothers, but not 
unwed fathers, the right to prohibit adoption); O n  v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,271 (1979) (requir- 
ing only husbands to pay alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,204 (1977) (gender- 
based survival benefits under the Social Security Act); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 
(1975) (differences in termination of child support based on chid's sex); Weinberger v. 
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975) (gender-based survivor's benefits under the Social 
Security Act); Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (federal statute requiring 
women officers in armed services to prove actual dependency of spouses in order to qualify 
for increased benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,77 (1971) (mandatory preference to men 
over women in the appointment of estate administrators). 
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. . . .  
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books 
gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions 
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th 
century the position of women in our society was, in many 
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War 
slave codes.lS8 
Thus, given the long, sordid history of sex-based discrimi- 
nation against women as a group, which is analogous to race- 
based discrimination against blacks, a statute designed to pro- 
vide a remedy for deprivations of the constitutional rights of the 
latter should be able to shelter the former from the same types of 
conduct. 
An alternative theory that could result in an affirmance of 
the lower court's opinion in Bray was suggested in Scott. The 
majority, expressing doubts as to whether the statute was 
designed to protect classes other than blacks and their support- 
ers, noted that there was legislative history to support the view 
that 5 1985(3) had a broader reach and implied that there was 
some indication that the statute could reach conspiracies aimed 
at a class on account of its political views or activities.lg9 The 
Scott dissent was willing to go further and explicitly hold that 
the statute was designed to protect those victimized because of 
their political viewpoint.lgO In Justice Blackmun's view, the stat- 
ute was designed to protect "all classes that seek to exercise their 
legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the 
victims of Klan violence."1g1 Thus, under this reading of the 
statute, a class based on unpopular political views would be 
appropriate for 8 1985(3)'s protection. 
Utilizing the alternative political conspiracy theory, women 
seeking an abortion could constitute a proper class in Bray. In 
Bray, the Operation Rescue blockaders formed their conspiracy 
in reaction and opposition to the right of women to seek an abor- 
tion. But for the women's political view that they had a consti- 
tutional right to seek an abortion, Operation Rescue would not 
have formed a conspiracy to prevent this class of women from 
gaining access to the abortion clinics. It is because of their polit- 
ical viewpoint, unpopular with the Operation Rescue activists, 
188. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85. 
189. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1983). 
190. Id at 850-51 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
191. Id. at 851. 
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that these women have been singled out as victims by the block- 
aders. Just as the Klan used terror tactics to prevent blacks 
from exercising their newly acquired constitutional rights, Oper- 
ation Rescue seeks through intimidation to accomplish the same 
end with respect to women seeking an abortion. 
Under the political conspiracy theory, the plaintiffs would 
have to show that they could not obtain adequate protection 
from the local police forces. The Scott dissenters stated that 
Congress intended under 5 1985(3) to provide a remedy to "any 
class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in 
danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local 
authorities."lg2 In Justice Blackmun's view, a plaintiff would 
not have to allege neglect on the part of state officers to enforce 
the law equally, rather an inference would be raised that there 
was ineffective state enforcement whenever a conspiracy 
involved invidious animus towards a class of persons.lg3 This 
would be especially true when the victimizers targeted a group 
because of its unpopular political views. This requirement is met 
in Bray. As the district court found, the local police depart- 
ments were unable to prevent the clinics' closure by the blockad- 
ers. In fact, the police on many occasions were outnumbered by 
the activists.lg4 Thus, the local police were unable to prevent the 
blockaders from denying women seeking abortions access to the 
clinics. The facts in Bray are similar to those that confronted 
the forty-second Congress and prompted it to enact 5 1985(3): 
the inability or unwillingness of the local law enforcement enti- 
ties to protect blacks and others in the exercise of their constitu- 
tional rights. Therefore, the remedy created to address a similar 
factual situation should be available to those whose rights are 
now violated by Operation Rescue's attempt to replace govern- 
ment by law with mob rule. 
An alternative theory to avoid the class-based animus pre- 
requisite altogether would be to argue that where a 5 1985(3) 
claim is based on a fundamental right of national citizenship, no 
discriminatory motivation is required. This rule would be con- 
sistent with the legislative history since many proponents of the 
statute stated that i-t was designed to protect all classes of citi- 
192. Id at 853. 
193. Id at 851. 
194. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 483, 1489 n.4 
(E.D. Va. 1989). 
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zens.lg5 Such a rule would also be consistent with Harris, 
wherein the Court stated that the criminal counterpart to 
5 1985(3) could reach a private conspiracy by whites to deprive 
other whites of constitutional rights.lg6 Similarly, the Guest 
Court expressly held in a case involving a conspiracy under 18 
U.S.C. 5 241 to deprive others of the right to interstate travel 
that there was no need to show racial discrimination when that 
right of national citizenship was infringed upon by others.lg7 
This view of the statute would rectify the confusion engendered 
by the Grzzn Court's failure to distinguish claims brought 
under 5 1985(3) alleging Thirteenth Amendment violations and 
claims alleging deprivations of the fundamental rights of 
national citizenship. 
Although the court may disagree as to whether women, or 
women with unpopular political views in the minds of Operation 
Rescue's adherents, constitute an appropriate class for 5 1985(3) 
purposes, there should be unanimity regarding the protection of 
a fundamental right of national citizenship. The Grzzn Court 
expressly recognized that the statute protected the right of inter- 
state travel and that Congress may legislate to prevent both pri- 
vate and governmental interference with that right.lg8 The Scott 
Court afiirmed that 5 1985(3) protected the right to interstate 
travel.lg9 In Bray, the district court found that a large percent- 
age of women who sought treatment at Washington, D.C., met- 
ropolitan area clinics travelled interstate to obtain those 
services.200 The court further found that the actions of Opera- 
tion Rescue in blockading abortion clinics interfered with the 
right of women to travel interstate.201 In light of the Supreme 
Court's prior rulings and the district court's factual findings, 
there should be little doubt that 5 1985(3) protects the constitu- 
tional right of women to travel interstate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the legislative history and the Court's own prece- 
dent, the Fourth Circuit's afiirmance of the district court's issu- 
195. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
196. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1882). 
197. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,760 (1966). 
198. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971). 
199. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1983). 
200. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F., Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D. 
Va. 1989). 
201. Id. at 1493. 
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ance of a permanent injunction against Operation Rescue shoula 
be upheld because the factual situation presented by the anti- 
abortion activists is similar to that of the South in 1871. Then, 
as now, massive numbers of private individuals formed organiza- 
tions and took actions designed to frustrate and set at naught 
constitutional rights. Then, the Klan sought to prevent blacks 
and others from exercising a host of rights, including those pro- 
tected under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend- 
ments, as well as the fundamental rights of national citizenship. 
Now, individuals militantly opposed to abortions have formed 
organizations designed to frustrate the right of women to cross 
state lines for the purposes of seeking abortions. In 1871, the 
local law enforcement officers stood powerless before the wrath 
of the Klan, proving completely ineffective in preventing the ter- 
ror that the Klan visited upon its victims and, at times, tacitly 
supporting the objectives of the Klan. Similarly, due to the mas- 
sive numbers of persons blockading abortion clinics under Oper- 
ation Rescue's aegis and the passions aroused by the abortion 
issue and Operation Rescue's tactics, local law enforcement 
officers are unable or unwilling to prevent them from denying 
access to abortion facilities to women who have traveled inter- 
state to utilize those clinics. Thus, both the factual situation at 
the time of the enactment of 8 1985(3) and that presented by 
Operation Rescue's obstruction of access to abortion clinics 
require a similar remedy. Section 1985(3) was designed for that 
purpose. 
Heinonline - -  66 Tul. L. Rev. 1404 1991-1992 
